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According to Colin Koopman, there is a politics endogenous to data and 
information itself, and Koopman locates this politics in the formats of data. 
Drawing from Foucault’s methodological orientation and, more specifically, 
Foucault’s conception of genealogical historical inquiry by emphasizing com-
plexity, contingency and critique, Koopman asks what are the conditions that 
make it possible for us to be our data? Koopman does not argue that we are 
nothing but our data but that, given our epoch of informational culture, data 
comprises a significant facet of our “being.”
Koopman’s thesis rests on the historical development of data formatting, 
illuminating how in the development from older analog technologies to more 
neoteric digital technologies, we have been molded into socio-politically mal-
leable denizens. Koopman’s political analysis of technics regards personality 
metrics and informatics as the project of measurable-amenability, a para-com-
municative category that Koopman identifies as valuable for political theory 
because it allows us to genealogically examine algorithmic culture. Koopman 
achieves this by drawing attention to the data structures, or “formats,” that are 
crucial for any kind of algorithmic operation whatsoever (which means that 
Koopman treats the algorithm transhistorically).
When did we become our data? Bridging research concerning informatics 
qua intelligence testing with the bureaucratization of paperwork vis-à-vis the 
universalization of standardized birth certificate forms, Koopman traces an 
arachnean genealogy that weaves together the datafication of birth, person-
ality, and race. Excavating the informatics of documentary identity alongside 
stabilizing mechanisms (e.g., the enforcement for birth registration through 
laws, bureaucratic requirements, and commercial practices), Koopman’s sur-
vey of “testing” and data-capture formatting begins with the early twentieth 
century, examining emergent platforms of informational identity and collec-
tion technologies. Koopman’s research is stilted upon three categories: docu-
mentary, psychological, and racial identity; Koopman maintains that both the 
“possibilities for, and limitations of, our selves are today deeply informed by 
bureaucratic paperwork, psychology, and race” (20). Scouring and citing pri-
mary text documents including mid-twentieth century reports on assessment, 
lending, and underwriting, Koopman illuminates the entrenched mechanics 
of redlining and other racialized operations of normative informational tech-
nologies. Koopman examines administrative and social technology such as 
“check box-clad printed blanks, filing systems, processing protocols, and com-
putational analytics” (155) from the mid-1910s to the mid-1930s, noting how 
these produced the functional foundation for contemporary state-sponsored 
surveillance, consumer and voter dataveillance, data-driven financialization, 
and the production of informational congeries of psychographic data.
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Koopman, in the tradition of Foucauldian media archeology (albeit also 
influenced by the Jürgen Habermas’s and John Dewey’s theories of pragmatist 
communicative democracy) utilizes a highly historical analysis that, prima facie, 
evades metaphysics and prioritizes transitional turnings. In turn, Koopman 
widens “programming” into an epistemic category that occupies the historical 
practice of formatting informational technology. With contemporary informa-
tional personhood under the duress of social media, metadata analysis, and 
the Foucauldian apothegm of the “conduct of conduct,” Koopman begins with 
the recomposition of the contemporaneous datafied self by following data’s 
accoutrement. In appropriating Foucault’s genealogical method while divorc-
ing it from disciplinary (bio)power, Koopman is indebted to Foucault’s gene-
alogical analytics of the present. Notably, while Foucault was certainly not a 
de-ontologist, his philosophical concern with historical particulars rather than 
necessary “transcendental” conditions meant that Foucault was not, primarily, 
an ontologist. This is precisely why Koopman’s use of Foucault relates to polit-
ical questions such as how and which data are important for the political and 
epistemic strategies through which we conduct ourselves.
Koopman asserts that the uptake of information theory in the 1940/50s is 
in need of explanation as it has been overlooked in political analyses of infor-
mational practices. Koopman delineates that today’s “informational person” 
is not determined by the spatio-temporal and statistical embodiment of dis-
ciplinary biopower but by “infopolitics,” or the data sets around which con-
duct accumulates. Although Foucauldian biopower is still operative today, 
it does not exhaustively account for the politics of Facebook, Google, or the 
NSA. According to Koopman, “infopolitics” cannot be simply reduced into 
biopolitics and while he accepts that “inchoate tactics of information can be 
located within these predecessor exercises of power” (163), Koopman’s argu-
ment presents “infopolitics’” political gravity as conditioned by the relation-
ship between format and subjectivity. Credentials such as our Facebook login, 
email address and login, frequent flier accounts, credit card data, PayPal data, 
bitcoin wallets and so on, there are endless streams of data through which we 
effortlessly transact our daily affairs. Therefore, rather than negating biopower, 
“infopower” is layered upon other enactive modalities of power; instead of 
suggesting a negation, “infopolitics” produces addition and stratification.
Koopman commits the beginning of his study to the genealogical analysis 
of identity’s datafied subjectification qua the “infopolitical” present, begin-
ning with documentary identity, moving through psychological identity and 
then racial identity; according to Koopman, “infopower” deploys techniques 
of formatting/formats in order to fasten and speed up its “informational per-
sons”—while this logic precedes digitality (e.g., birth certificates and audit-
ing), it has become ubiquitous through digital platforms. Unlike other philos-
ophers and political theorists who have developed or amended Foucauldian 
biopower alongside Deleuze’s development, Koopman rejects the precedence 
of Deleuze’s late work on “control society” (or “control power”). This is pri-
marily because Koopman insists that Deleuze’s conception of ceaseless con-
trol-through-modulation “does not look at the past with the empirical rigor of 
genealogy” but, instead, is steeped in the future and oversaturated “in a mode 
of eschatological prediction” (169).
Koopman’s research on various historical endeavors concerning analysis, 
interpretation and public distribution as it relates to the decisive project of 
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informatics is erudite due to its empirical rigor. Consider, for instance, when 
Koopman examines the Children’s Bureau Project, an early example of the 
informational audit and the assembly of identity. Detailing a critical instru-
ment of measure, Koopman scours the period between 1913–1917 to examine 
the birth registration test’s slow rise before it was eventually appropriated by 
the Census Bureau. The technology of the birth registration, which sought to 
identify what proportion of babies in specific locales or years were registered 
with the Bureau, demonstrates the rise of comprehensive informational sys-
tems (52).
Koopman chronicles how the development of data technologies is a politi-
cal project that trivializes certain groups, enlightening the politics of data man-
agement. For instance, despite the efforts performed by a force of volunteer 
women and directed by Etta R. Goodwin and Julia Lathrop (the first female 
director of a federal government agency), the Census Bureau made no mention 
of these women’s critical contributions or Lathrop’s agency to the establish-
ment of the Birth Registration Area project. While this is merely one detail 
of Western history’s squelching of female intellectual contributions amongst 
many, “[t]his silenced conflict over data management leadership indicates that 
not only was there a politics of the information itself, but also a much more 
familiar politics of information control” (54).
Koopman recalls chief statistician Cressy Wilbur’s remarks in 1915 con-
cerning the birth certificate’s “increasing importance to protect the rights and 
insure the privileges of the individual” (58), citing examples of school enroll-
ment, limits on age of child labor and the fulfillment of pensions for widows 
with children. Prognosticating practices such as the “old age pension project,” 
these coercive measures of datafication inputting, processing, and outputting 
instantiated an articulation of datapower that “conducts our conduct” (159). 
As Koopman keenly outlines with the formation of the Social Security Board 
and Social Security Numbers, by the early twentieth century information was 
increasingly becoming a legislatively and state-engineered statistical system of 
“dividualization.” “Dividualization,” a term originally popularized by Gilles 
Deleuze, refers to the decomposition of the individual into a variegated series 
of numerical attributes and dimensions (e.g., scores, ranks, or features) that 
are relevant and useful for the production of profits by data industries and 
financial networks. Today, “dividualization” transpires via risk-ratings, credit 
scores, consumer profiling and other operations purposed for algorithmic 
prediction. The challenge, in 1915, was the lack of data—beginning with the 
consequent development of information theories and cyberneticians’ research, 
the eventual development of digital technologies would solve this through the 
management of complex data sets, or what is, today, colloquially termed “Big 
Data.” Today’s “data episteme” is an epistemology where “the need for more 
and more data is the spawn of data itself” (160).
In Foucauldian fashion, Koopman does not identify epistemic breakages 
so much as he does rifts, where increased complexity is mediated by ideolog-
ical contiguity. One marked example of this is the SSN as an informational 
marker of identity that was made to operate without leaning in any way on 
forms of biometric certification to externalize its function; the SSN realized a 
sociological-cum-political possibility that the birth certificate had announced 
but not realized:
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[p]assports had relied on photographic resemblances, signatures 
on unique motions, of the hand, fingerprints on the physics of our 
digit. Birth certificates began the process of a more minimal endoc-
umentation of living data: parentage, data date of birth, sex (the 
original standard forms did not even measure length and weight). 
The SSN inaugurated the next step of a purely informational iden-
tification: the use of identifiers that do not refer to anything other 
than the unique information that they are (63).
This transposition is critical because, contra biometrics, with the SSN we see 
“infopower” as concerned with identifying information in a kind of “pure” 
and nonrepresentational form, rather than indexing human morphology. In 
contrast to the prosthetically-tethered and phenotypically-externalized rela-
tionship between data and anatomy, with the SSN we see the emergence of a 
non-indexical relationship between the “self” and their data.
As Koopman notes, the success of the birth-registration project, until 1935, 
rested upon the ingenuity of collection and storage technologies (e.g., copying 
subsets of previous data by soliciting files from earlier publications, standard-
izing filing systems and auditing for accuracy). Not only does the SSN solidify 
a non-representational correlate to identification but, in turn, it also imple-
mented a “universal technology that all (eligible) workers would be registered 
into” (64). Previously, no insurance company had imagined such universality 
possible. Approaching selfhood genealogically, Koopman examines subjectifi-
cation’s location within a complex series of apparatuses, practices, machina-
tions and assemblages whereby the production of psychological selfhood is 
conducted through an arrangement of techniques centered around the crucial 
technology of “the test,” whereby we see modern techniques for governing 
human individuality recruited.
Taking a marked interest in functional processes of production vis-a-vis 
selfhood qua personality rendered measurable, Koopman follows in the gene-
alogical-archaeological tradition of Arnold Davidson (and his studies of nine-
teenth-century notions of perversion) and Nikolas Sose’s sociological approach 
to individuation. With “careful genealogical attention to the operative tech-
niques and functioning concepts of psychological science,” Koopman argues 
that “becoming our personalities” involves, at least in part, also “becoming 
out data” (70). Koopman genealogy traces a direct line from Francis Galton’s 
IQ intelligence tests to the development of personality tests with the Personal 
Data Sheet Psychoneurotic Inventory in 1918, explicating how this led to the 
development of psychographic metric inventories such as those processed by 
Cambridge Analytica, which were heavily employed by the 2016 United States 
presidential candidates’ consulting teams.
In his chapter on the informatics of racialized credit, Koopman examines 
specific techniques funding government redlining from 1934 onwards, which 
involved real estate-specific technologies such as the “racialized appraisal” 
(127). Alongside factors such as “swamp odors” and “traffic exhaust,” it had 
been common practice in residential appraising to factor racial valuation into 
an appraisal algorithm until the 1937 edition of McMichael’s Appraising Manual. 
By reformatting social acts of racialization into scientific processes of datafica-
tion, race was made additive—as Koopman remarks, “[t]he infopolitics of race 
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is thus layered on phenotypes, biologies, bodies, and more. The result is that 
racialization thereby became different, more multiple, more heterogenous, and 
therefore more complicated to track” (147).
Uncovering the informatics of race, real estate appraisal, and residential 
segregation/redlining, Koopman demystifies congeries of contemporary data-
fication. Examining Gordon Allport’s work on trait theory and trait nominal-
ism (where Allport argued that traits could be understood as units of person-
ality), Koopman shows how, as early as 1928, the mechanics of algorithmic 
analysis grafted personality psychology upon an enactment of formatting 
techniques. Excavating algorithms as information-processing technologies 
embedded in wider assemblies of formatting, Koopman’s approach empha-
sizes the historical use of algorithmic analysis through the aperture of broader 
data assemblies, as these techniques of data-based formatting had been used 
for nearly a century prior to their contemporaneous deployment. Examining 
the science of measure through the vantage of intelligence testing, Koopman 
examines how the adoption of an informatics apparatus colonized domains 
previously thought sacrosanct.
Koopman’s erudite trans-historical analysis underscores format as a func-
tional and political operative that transmogrifies informationalized persons, 
or “users,” into abstract data points. Koopman concludes that data, therefore, 
does not simply facilitate forms of communicative interaction but “functions 
as locales for a politics of fastening that is irreducible to a politics of com-
munication” (188). Koopman’s genealogical approach to algorithmic data qua 
public health and knowledge practices demonstrates that “surface politics” 
such as human welfare projects and official policies are, in fact, brimming with 
politically dormant exigencies.
#DIFFERENTIATE #SPECIATE: On Jairus Victor Grove’s Savage 
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Georges Bataille began the first volume of The Accursed Share as such: “No one 
can say without being comical that he is getting ready to overturn things. He 
must overturn, and that is all.”1 Whatever else it does, Jairus Victor Grove’s 
Savage Ecology overturns many things without comically announcing as much. 
The result is a darkly explosive work.
